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The World Health Organization (WHO)’s 2010 report on health 
systems financing for universal health coverage[1] proposed various 
innovative mechanisms for raising additional resources for health. 
These proposals were primarily based on a background paper by 
Stenberg et al.[2] on the same topic, in which each of the options was 
ranked according to its fund-raising potential.
South Africa (SA) is currently in the process of implementing a 
National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme. The resource requirement 
for implementation of this scheme is substantial, and the NHI 
White Paper (hereinafter referred to as ‘the White Paper’) outlines 
five scenarios to meet the middle-ground projected shortfall of 
ZAR71.9 billion (2010 prices) by 2025/26.[3] Very little information 
about the factors and assumptions that were taken into account, 
such as medical inflation and changes in disease profile, is provided 
in the White Paper.
Scenario A includes the introduction of a payroll tax, a surcharge 
on taxable income and increases in the rate of value-added tax (VAT). 
Scenario B utilises a combination of the surcharge with a payroll tax, 
while scenario C is a combination of a surcharge on taxable income 
with an increase in VAT. Scenario D is a payroll tax with a surcharge 
on taxable income, while scenario E is a surcharge on taxable income 
only. Four of the five scenarios include a surcharge on taxable income, 
and all five scenarios include percentage increases spread over the 
time period.[3] However, these are not the only options available. The 
White Paper also elaborates on excise duties on alcohol and tobacco 
products, reallocation of medical scheme funding and the proposed 
carbon tax as potential sources of NHI funding.
This article considers excise duties on alcohol and tobacco products 
along with the various other low-medium, medium, medium-
high and high potential fund-raising options, without a voluntary 
element, as defined and proposed by the WHO, and reviews each in 
the SA context. Stenberg et al.[2] used various methods to calculate 
the potential of each option to generate additional resources for the 
health system. Where possible, this article uses these methods or 
methods of its own to estimate the increase in the health budget that 
could potentially result from the implementation of the mechanisms. 
These elementary calculations assume no change in economic or 
social behaviour.
The result of the calculations is compared with the average 
yearly increase required by the NHI. The comparison is based on 
the assumption that the mechanism was implemented in 2010 
and that the proceeds from the mechanism are earmarked for the 
health sector. Possible costs or negative effects of the mechanism’s 
implementation in SA are extrapolated from the literature.
Health sector funding requirement
The White Paper states that the requirements for health (in real 
2010 financial terms) will increase from ZAR109.8 billion in 2010 
to ZAR255.8 billion in 2025/26, the proposed roll-out period of the 
scheme.[3] In addition to this estimation, McIntyre[4] modelled the 
resource requirements for three health financing reforms, one of 
which involves pursuing universal health coverage through an NHI 
scheme. Estimations varied widely depending on assumptions, but 
her ‘best guess’ scenario increased health resource requirements from 
state funding to ZAR295 billion by 2025 (2010 prices).[4]
Fig. 1 illustrates the gap between the funding requirement necessi-
tated by NHI implementation (solid line) and the projected funding 
(dashed line). The projected funding assumes that the budget allocated 
to the health sector increases at the White Paper’s middle-ground 
funding scenario rate of 3.5% between 2010 and 2025. Even though 
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the White Paper assumes that this is its 
most likely scenario, a GDP growth rate 
of 3.5% seems optimistic. In the recently 
pub lished statement by the South African 
Reserve Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee, 
it is stated that GDP growth in 2015 was a 
mere 1.3% and that growth of only 0.8%, 
1.4% and 1.8% is expected for 2016, 2017 
and 2018, respectively.[5] Given this weak 
econ omic outlook, it is possible that even the 
White Paper’s most pessimistic annual fund-
ing growth scenario, in which funding to the 
health sector grows by only 2%, could be a 
challenge to achieve. Nevertheless, given the 
information currently available, we thought it 
was most appropriate to remain in line with 
the White Paper and base our calculations 
on its middle-ground scenario of 3.5%. All 
calculations in this article have been adjusted 
for inflation using 2010 as the base year.
For the funding requirement, the predic-
tion provided by the White Paper is used. 
This is a conservative estimate when com-
pared with that of McIntyre,[4] and is that the 
SA health budget should grow to ZAR255.8 
billion by 2025.[3]
The White Paper predicts various short-
falls in 2025/26 based on various specific 
health funding growth over the period – 
ZAR71.9 billion if the baseline resources 
increase by 3.5% per year (Fig. 1), ZAR27.6 
billion if baseline resources increase by 
5.0% per year, and finally ZAR108 billion 
if baseline resources grow by 2.0% per 
year. Rather than looking at the shortfall in 
2025/26, this article calculates the cumulative 
shortfall under the 3.5% growth scenario 
over the 15-year period between 2010/11 and 
2025/26, the NHI implementation period. 
This allowed us to calculate an average 
percentage shortfall for each year within 
the period and compare this value with the 
potential funding contribution for each of 
the instruments under review.
The shortfall, represented by the space 
between the solid and dashed lines in Fig. 1, 
aggregates to ZAR378.5 billion over the 
15 years. This cumulative shortfall represents 
16.4% of the cumulative funding projection 
over the same period, implying that if the 
funding, as projected by the 3.5% growth 
scenario, was and is increased by a further 
16.4% each year between 2010 and 2025, 
the cumulative funding would equal the 
required cumulative expenditure over the 
implementation period. The five tax scenarios 
outlined by the White Paper are an attempt to 
address the shortfall, and this article explores 
the feasibility of using innovative finance 
mechanisms to moderate the size of the 
probable surcharge on taxable income – an 
inclusion in four of the five tax scenarios.
The options
Recognising the additional resources requ-
ired for universal healthcare, the WHO pro-
posed 13 options for increasing funding for 
health. For this article, the options catego-
rised as having a low fundraising potential 
as well as those with a voluntary or char-
ity element have been disregarded.[2] Only 
increasing corporate taxes, imposing sector-
specific corporate taxes, imposing a levy 
on currency transactions, increasing excise 
duties on alcohol and tobacco products and 
imposing excise duties on unhealthy foods 
will therefore be discussed.
Corporate tax
Corporate tax differentials, or a country’s 
corporate tax rate relative to countries with 
which it competes for investment, are more 
important than the absolute level.[6,7] SA’s 
top marginal corporate income tax rate is 
currently 28%, with lower rates applying 
to smaller businesses.[8] When compared 
with Brazil, Russia, China and India, SA’s 
corporate income tax rate is in the middle of 
the range (Table 1).
Diamond et al.[7] point out the negative 
economic effects of a relatively high corpo-
rate tax rate in the USA compared with other 
developed countries, i.e. an outflow of capi-
tal and a consequent reduction in productive 
capacity. In a study on the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
countries, Johansson et al.[9] label corporate 
income taxes as more harmful to economic 
growth than any other tax.
Compared with the other BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, China, India and SA) countries, 
SA may have some space for an increase 
in corporate taxation. However, following 
the abolishment of the Secondary Tax on 
Companies on 1 April 2012,[10] it is unlikely 
that government would have an appetite for 
such a policy move. In the 2013/14 financial 
year, corporate tax revenue in SA amounted 
to ZAR177.3 billion,[11] or ZAR151.3 billion 
at constant 2010 prices.[12] Covering the NHI 
shortfall (16.4%) during that year would 
have required a 13.2% increase in total 
revenue from corporate income taxation.
The WHO report does not suggest an 
increase in the taxation rate for all companies, 
but rather for the most profitable. If the 
shortfall is to be financed by an increase in 
the corporate tax rate of specific industries 
instead of all industries, the magnitude of 
the increase per company would have to 
be greater. The economic effects resulting 
from higher relative corporate tax rates that 
Diamond et al.[7] discuss could be magnified 
or diminished in these industries. Because of 
their higher profits, such companies might be 
able to absorb a greater tax shock, resulting 
in a subsequent smaller macroeconomic 
impact. However, if tax rate increases are too 
severe, capital flight from these profitable 
industries would lead to comparatively 
worse economic effects. Further research 
should be done to estimate the corporate 
tax rate threshold of SA’s most profitable 
industries and determine whether this could 
NHI funding requirement
Projection of funding (annual increase of 3.5% in baseline expenditure)
280 000
260 000
240 000
220 000
200 000
180 000
160 000
140 000
120 000
100 000
ZA
Rm
20
10
/1
1
20
11
/1
2
20
12
/1
3
20
13
/1
4
20
14
/1
5
20
16
/1
7
20
17
/1
8
20
18
/1
9
20
19
/2
0
20
21
/2
2
20
22
/2
3
20
23
/2
4
20
25
/2
6
20
15
/1
6
20
20
/2
1
20
24
/2
5
Fig. 1. Projected funding gap (2010 prices).[2]
Table 1. Corporate tax rates for  
BRICS member countries (current  
on 1 January 2015)[10]
Country
Top marginal corporate 
income tax rate
India 34%
Brazil 34%
SA 28%
China 25%
Russia 20%
BRICS = Brazil, Russia, China, India and SA.
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be high enough to significantly affect the NHI budget shortfall without 
leading to severe macroeconomic consequences.
Levies on financial transactions/instruments
Stenberg et al.[2] provide several examples of how financial 
transactions can be utilised to raise more revenue for health, e.g. 
Argentina taxes current account debits and credits, Brazil taxes bank 
withdrawals and earmarks the revenue for its public health sector, 
and Zambia has a levy on all gross interest earned on any savings 
or deposit accounts, treasury bills, government bonds or other 
financial instruments. In addition, the issuing of diaspora bonds in 
some countries such as India, Israel and Sri Lanka is mentioned as 
a mechanism to raise revenue for health.[2] This article reviews the 
possibility of raising additional funds in SA through a levy imposed 
on currency transactions.
Currency transactions are any transactions in which the buying 
and/or selling of foreign currency for domestic currency are involved. 
Stenberg et al.[2] mention that most discussions involving the imposition 
of a currency transaction levy have focused on imposing such a levy in 
high-income countries, and then distributing these funds to lower-
income countries. The number of these transactions is relatively low 
in lower-income countries compared with high-income countries, and 
the assumption is that the costs might outweigh the benefits when such 
levies are imposed in lower-income countries. The associated costs 
include increased market volatility, increased economic uncertainty,[13] 
and a decrease in the number of transactions due to the levy,[14] a pivotal 
element of any economy. [2] There is also significant debate around the 
technical and political feasibility of such a tax, as it has been posited 
that it is relatively easy to evade through market migration to offshore 
tax havens or to avoid through asset substitution.[15] Schmidt[16] used an 
increase in the spread between the bid and ask price in the dollar/yen 
currency market between 1986 and 2006 as a proxy for the imposition 
of such a tax. It was found that a 1% increase in the spread caused a 
0.43% decrease in the volume of currency transactions.[16]
The methodology applied to India described by Stenberg et 
al.[2] is now applied to SA. SA, although a smaller economy, still 
managed USD21 billion daily turnover (current prices) from currency 
transactions in 2013.[17] If the WHO’s High Level Taskforce for 
Innovative Inter national Financing suggestion of a 0.005% levy on 
annual turnover[18] had been accepted in SA, ZAR2.9 billion worth of 
revenue (2010 prices and average 2013 exchange rate of ZAR9.65[19] 
per USD) could have been added to the SA revenue pool in 2013. It 
can, however, be expected that this amount would be slightly lower, 
as the imposition of the tax would also lead to fewer daily currency 
transactions and therefore less daily turnover. Even if there was, 
unrealistically, no decrease in the number of transactions and the entire 
amount of revenue raised by the levy had been earmarked for the health 
sector in 2013, the levy would have been able to decrease the shortfall 
by 14.5% from ZAR20 billion to ZAR17.1 billion.[20] It is clear that that 
even under the best circumstances, a tax on currency transaction would 
only be able to reduce the shortfall marginally on its own.
Excise taxes on products harmful to health
The harmful side-effects of tobacco consumption (e.g. neoplastic, 
vascular and respiratory diseases,[21] cancer, abdominal aortic 
aneurysms and cataracts[22]) and excessive alcohol consumption 
(e.g. infectious diseases, stroke, cancer, diabetes, neuropsychiatric 
diseases, liver and pancreatic disease[23,24]) are well documented. In 
fact, research has shown that tobacco and alcohol are the second and 
third largest contributors, respectively, to the global disease burden 
and together cause nearly 12% of the world’s disability-adjusted life-
years. There is therefore a rational reason for the widespread advocacy 
for the imposition of excise duties on alcohol and tobacco products, 
as it has been shown that these duties can decrease consumption and 
subsequently decrease the disease burden.[25,26]
In SA, specific excise duties on alcohol and tobacco contributed 
3.2% to total tax revenue in 2013/14, or approximately ZAR24.7 
billion (constant 2010 prices).[12] If SA had increased the revenue 
generated from these taxes and earmarked the increased revenue 
to the health sector to cover the NHI shortfall in 2013/14, it would 
have had to increase tax revenue from excise duties on alcohol and 
tobacco by 80.8%.[6] Given the effect that an increase in the tax rates 
would have on demand in the formal market for these goods, on 
average, the tax rates themselves would have had to be increased by 
even more than 80.8%.
Stenberg et al.[2] also suggest a tax on unhealthy food. This can be 
done through increased VAT on foods that are high in fat or sugar, 
or a specific tax per unit on unhealthy products such as carbonated 
sugary beverages, sweets, ice cream, etc.[2] The most widely advocated 
instrument, which SA is in the process of implementing, is a specific 
tax on sugar-sweetened beverages. Similar to alcohol and tobacco, the 
side-effects of excessive consumption of these products can be severe 
and include obesity, diabetes, coronary heart events and strokes.[27,28]
The rationale for excise duties on unhealthy products is therefore 
similar for all products. The price elasticity of demand for alcohol[29-31] 
and tobacco[29,31] is traditionally relatively low,[31,32] meaning that 
the imposition of a tax can contribute substantially to the total 
revenue pool.[2] The price elasticity of demand for unhealthy food 
products varies more widely, depending on the substitutability of the 
product. [31] If the tax is high enough to affect consumption, the health 
benefits from decreased consumption are able to decrease the health 
budget requirement.[31] The tax rate should therefore be set in such a 
way that this twofold benefit maximises societal welfare.[2]
The imposition of specific excise taxes on harmful products has 
two major counter-arguments. The first of these relates to their 
potential to increase smuggling and the size of the illicit market.[33,34] 
This argument is specifically related to tobacco, although research 
shows that the size of this market and the effects of the tax are often 
overstated by the tobacco industry.[33,35,36] Nevertheless, commenting on 
the illicit cigarette market in SA, Van Walbeek[37] states that the ‘Illicit 
tobacco trade is a problem and should be taken seriously’. Research 
shows that until 2010 there was no evidence that the market for illicit 
cigarettes had increased,[33] despite a significant increase in the real tax 
per cigarette packet in SA from 1993 onwards.[33] The alcohol sector 
industries in SA have often argued against increases in excise taxes by 
noting the potential for increased illicit liquor consumption.[38,39]
Even though taxes on unhealthy foods will not lead to an increase 
in illicit trade, the regressivity of excise taxes on these foods along 
with alcohol and tobacco[40-44] is worth debate. With an ever-increas-
ing Gini coefficient (0.66 in 1993 and 0.7 in 2008), SA is one of the 
most economically unequal societies in the world.[45] For this reason, 
special caution is necessary when considering a tax with regressive 
effects.
In terms of the tax on unhealthy food, there are ways of 
circumventing the regressive effects of the tax by subsidising healthier 
options.[41] It must be kept in mind, however, that the revenue raised 
by the tax on unhealthy food can be negated by the subsidy on 
healthier options.
Discussion
The White Paper has a specific focus on payroll taxes, surcharges on 
taxable income and increases in VAT as fiscal instruments that could 
cover the funding shortfall caused by the implementation of NHI. It also 
provides some discussion on current employer contributions to medical 
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schemes being reallocated to the NHI fund, the current tax credit for 
medical scheme membership being scaled down, and the potential 
utilisation of the carbon tax in the health sector. No specific estimation 
of the size of the effect that these actions might have on the shortfall is 
provided, and further research into this area is strongly recommended.
This article reviewed various funding options, other than those 
already under consideration, that are available to the SA government 
to raise additional resources for its health sector.
Raising corporate taxation could raise enough funds, but the losses 
due to capital flight might be too much for the SA economy to bear. The 
increase would therefore have to be moderate, and it is unlikely that a 
welfare-maximising corporate tax rate could raise sufficient government 
income, especially if only specific companies or industries are targeted. 
A financial transaction tax, specifically a levy on currency transactions, 
is also unlikely to raise the required resources on its own, even without 
a likely decrease in the number of transactions. Finally, the required 
increase in the tax on tobacco and alcohol would have to be very 
large, even when assuming that consumption patterns would remain 
unchanged. The imposition of a tax on unhealthy food products is a very 
new idea and something that could be explored further as an option 
for SA. Nevertheless, the problem with excise duties is their regressivity 
which is a specific problem for a country as economically unequal as SA.
Yates[46] has identified progressive taxes as key to financing a health 
system’s striving towards universal health coverage. The premise 
would therefore promote increases in corporate taxes[46] and levies 
on financial transactions,[47] and discount taxes on tobacco, alcohol 
and unhealthy foods. Nevertheless, regressivity is not the only cost 
associated with the imposition of these fund-raising mechanisms, 
and the increase in the tax revenue would have to be weighed against 
these costs for each mechanism.
The White Paper clearly outlines five scenarios for revenue generation, 
all of which are combinations of more than a single source. If more 
mechanisms are used, less tax will have to be collected from each one, 
increasing the possibility that SA will be able to collect more tax revenue 
for the health sector without compromising the rest of the economy. All 
tax mechanisms have associated administrative costs,[48,49] which also 
have to be taken into account when deciding on how many mechanisms 
should be implemented.
Conclusion 
The calculations in this article make very strong assumptions and 
should by no means be confused with modelling. They are merely 
utilised as devices to illustrate to the reader the massive task that is 
set before the SA National Treasury to finance the implementation 
of the NHI scheme. The current scenario that makes use of the most 
sources of income (surcharge on taxable income, VAT increase and 
a payroll tax) has implications for the working population, the poor 
and employers. This article has outlined additional mechanisms to 
modify the burden on the average South African.
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